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OF MISTRIAL-PLEA OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT
The state entered a motion for a mistrial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence, which evidence tended to exculpate the defendant,
and the jury was discharged without the defendant's consent. Defendant's
plea of autrefois acquit to a new indictment was denied. Held, on appeal,
reversed. The defendant's plea should have been sustained, and the new
indictment as against him dismissed, to preserve his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. State v. Locklcar, 16 N.J. 232, 108 A.2d 436
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
Although the National Government, and most of the states, have a
prohibition embodied in their constitutions against placing a person twice
in jeopardy for the same offense, it is not purely a Constitutional product,1
but is also declaratory of the ancient principles of common law' When
jeopardy attaches is a question upon which all the authorities are not
agreed. 3 Generally, in the absence of consent by the accused or an urgent
necessity, a jury once impaneled and sworn in a criminal case cannot
be discharged before a verdict without effecting an acquittal of the
accused and preventing him from again being placed upon trial for the
same offense under the former jeopardy doctrine.4  However, the discharge
of a jury in case of a manifest necessity does not afford the basis of a
plea of former jeopardy."
1. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. (. ..nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb . . .); FLA. CONST. DECLARATION
or RIcITS, § 12 (1944).
2. Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
3. People v. Terrill, 132 Cal. 497, 498, 64 Pac. 894, 895 (1901). "leopardy
attaches when a defendant is placed upon his trial before a competent court and jury
upon a valid indictment."; Klein v. State, 157 Ind. 146, 147, 60 N.E. 1036, 1037 (1901).
"A defendant is not in legal jeopardy, within the constitutional restriction, until he
has been put upon his trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment
or information which is sufficient in form and substance, to sustain a conviction";
State ex rel. Larkin v. Lewis, 54 So.2d 199, 201 (Vla. 1951). "In absence of circumstances
justifying declaration of a mistrial ieopardy attaches when the court is legally constituted,
has jurisdiction of the cause and accused, when the charge is legally sufficient on which
to predicate a verdict and judgment and when the jury is sworn."; State v. Rook. 61 Kan.
382, 59 Pac. 653, 655 (1900). "A defendant in a criminal case can not be said to
be in jeopardy unless he has been arraigned, or waived arraignment, and pleaded not
guilty or had such plea entered for him .... "
4. Coroero v. U.S., 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931); Bell v. State, 44 Ala. 393 (1869);
State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 23 So.2d 484 (1945); Ryan v. McNeill,
141 Fla. 304, 193 So. 67 (1940); Smith v. State. 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939);
State ex rel. Dato v. Nimes, 134 Fla. 675, 184 So. 244 (1938).
5. State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 23 So.2d 484 (1945); State
ex rel. Dato v. Himes, 134 Fla. 675, 184 So. 244 (1938); Holt v. State. 160 Tenn. 366,
24 S.W.2d 886 (1930).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
To be sure, it would be impossible to define all the circumstances
which would render it possible for the court to declare an urgent, manifest
or imperious necessity. Except as found in decided cases,6 the circumstances
that may constitute an urgent necessity justifying the discharge of a jun
in criminal cases are left to the sound discretion of the presiding judge,
acting under his oath of office and having due regard for the rights of
the accused and the state.7 A trial can be discontinued when particular
circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failure to
discontinue would defeat the ends of justice." For whatever cause a jury
is discharged, it must take place in open court.?
III the instant case the state made its motion for a mistrial after
the trial had consumed 19 days and all the evidence had been presented.
The attorney for the state admitted, on oral argument, that the new
evidence was exculpatory toward defendant and not incriminating. As
a general rule, in most jurisdictions, in the absence of statute,0 a state
cannot appeal or bring a writ of error proceeding from a judgment in favor
of the defendant in a criminal case." Likewise, in criminal cases when
new evidence is discovered, after a verdict, the defendant cannot be
tried again since to do so would constitute double jeopardy.12  Bearing
these two general principles in mind, the state's purpose in asking for a
mistrial becomes readily discernible. However, there apparently is no
logical reason why this exculpatory evidence should be grounds for a
mistrial since there would be no undue hardship on either side if this
new evidence were presented before the court, and the jury allowed to
consider it in the light of all the other evidence. Not to do so would
seem to be an abuse of the absolute necessity rule and would result in
the unnecessary harassing of the defendant.13
6. U.S. v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (U.S. 1824); State v. Nelson. 19 R.I. 467,
34 At!. 990 (1896); Green v. State, 147 Tenn. 299, 247 S.W. 84 (1923).
7. Logan v. U.S., 144 U.S. 263 (1892)(The jury in a capital case after considering
,the verdict for 40 hours were unable to agree. field, they may be discharged by the
court on its own motion); State v. Slorah, 118 Me. 203, 106 At. 768 (1919). (The
defendant while viewing the scene of the crime with the iury cried out: "Take me
away or I will go insane." Ield, there was grounds for the discharge of the jury).
8. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1952); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S.
684; 685 (1948) ".Ihe dissolution of the first court martial proceeding was dictated
by the pressing military tactical situation."; State v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435. 23 So.2d
484 (1945).
9. Kamen v. Gray, 169 Kan. 664, 220 P.2d 160 (1950); Holt v, State, 160 Tenn.
366, 24 S.W.2d 886 (1930).
10. Comm. v. Williams, 230 Kv 82, 18 S.W.2d 882 (1929); Comm. v. Prall,
146 Ky. 109, 142 SAV. 202 (1912);'State v. Brown, 8 Okla. Crim. Rep. 40, 126 Pac.
245 (1912); State v. Hotel MeCreary Co.. 68 W. Va. 130, 69 S.E 472 (1910.
11. U.S. v. Weissman, 266 U.S. 377 (1924); City of Newark v. Pulverman,
12 N.J. 105, 95 A.2d 889 (Sup. Ct. 1953); State v. Hort, 90 N.J.L. 261. 101 Att.
278 (1917).
12. Cl. Bizzell v. State, 71 So.2d 735 (Fla. 1954); Potter v. State, 91 Fla. 938,
109 So. 91 (1926).
13. People v. Barrett, 2 Gaines N.Y. 305 (1805).
CASENOTES
In Florida it is said that the causes which create the necessity must
fall under one of three distinct categories. 4 Generally, as to the problem
of what constitutes an extreme and absolute necessity, there is no acceptable
categorical answer, as indicated.'- 5 It may be determined by the discretion
of the trial judge, and may range from what the judge thinks are prejudicial
remarks on the part of the defendant's attorney,' 6 to a dismissal of a jury
which could not agree after long deliberation. 7 In considering this aspect
of what is an absolute necessity, we should be careful not to become
over-zealous in our protection of the rights of the accused,' 8 but we should
equally bear in mind the protection of the public represented by the
state. In the absence of any concrete principle, it appears that jeopardy
will attach unless there arises some reason why the court cannot function. '
JAMEs L. LINuS
DIVORCE-DIRECT AND COLLATERAL ATTACK-SUIT
BY STRANGERS
Strangers to a divorce decree sought to attack it directly by a bill in
the nature of a bill of review on the ground that the decree was obtained
by fraud. Except for such divorce decree, appellants would be the sole
heirs of the deceased. Held, such an attack may be made by a stranger
to a decree when his interests are substantially affected thereby, but the
decree will be set aside only insofar as his interests are concerned. Jones
v. Goolsby, 68 So.2d 89 (Miss. 1953).
Subject to certain limitations, a court having jurisdiction of divorce
cases may, for good cause shown and upon due proceedings, seasonably
set aside or modify its own judgments or decrees of divorce on its own
motion or on the application of one of the parties.' Whether a particular
decree should or should not be opened, 2 modified,' or annulled, 4 rests
largely within the discretion of the court."
14. State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, 156 Fla. 435, 436, 23 So.2d 484, 485 (1945)
(The causes which create the necessity must fall under one of three heads, namely:
"(1) where the court is compelled by law to be adjourned before the jury can agree
upon a verdict; (2) where the prisoner by his own misconduct places it out of the
power of the jury to investigate his case correctly, thereby obtaining an unfair advantage
of the state, or is himself . . . prevented from being able to attend to his trial;(3) where there is no possibility for the jury to agree upon and return a verdict.").
15. See note 7 supra.
16. Mack v. Comm., 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 78 (1941).
17. Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939).
18. Kepner v. U.S., 195 U.S. 100, 136 (1904).
19. State ex rel. Alcala v. Grayson, sujra note 14.
1. Ex parte Favors, 225 Ala. 675, 145 So. 146 (1932); Brook v. Baker, 208
Ark. 654, 187 S.W.2d 169 (1945); Reimers v. McEIree, 238 Iowa 791, 28 N.W.2d
569 (1947).
2. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 97 N.J.Eq. 298. 127 Atl. 185 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925),
reversing, 96 N.J.Eq. 29, 125 Atl. 490 (Ch. 1924).
3. Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246 N.YSupp. 118 (3d Dep't 1930).
4. Walker v. Walker, 198 Wash. 150, 87 P.2d 479 (1939).
5. Keller v. Keller, 139 Ind. 38, 38 NE. 337 (1894).
